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ABORTION ON MATERNAL DEMAND:
PATERNAL SUPPORT LIABILITY
IMPLICATIONS
GEORGE S. SWAN*
John and Jane Doe, say, marry; Jane gets pregnant; John
wants the child; Jane doesn't, and exercises her unqualified
prerogative of getting it aborted; and that's that. Now take
the opposite case: Jane is pregnant; John doesn't want the
kid; Jane does, and refuses to abort it; they divorce; John
has to support the kid he never wanted.'
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses one rationale behind holding fathers civ-
illy and criminally liable for the maintenance of their infant chil-
* Member of the Ohio Bar.
1. Sobran, Of Ms. and Men, NAT'L REv., May 24, 1974, at 579, 581. Early this year Mr.
Sobran elaborated upon his reflection on the father's plight:
Abortion as a principle threatens the structure of the family, since by reducing the
fetus to the status of a tumor within the woman it denies the interest and, especially,
the authority of the man who begot it. And if he has no say in whether she decides
to abort, how can he be held responsible for her decision? For instance, why may
not the defendant in a paternity suit argue: "Look, this 'ort of action made sense
when the consequences of impregnation were inexorable. But law and science are now
so advanced as to make them optional-and her option, not mine. She could have
gotten an abortion; she chose not to; I had no say in the matter, and was not even
consulted. The most she could plausibly ask would be that I go Dutch treat on the
cost of terminating her pregnancy and even this doubtful. She alone decided to bear
this child; she alone is responsible. Let her therefore support it by herself." And if
an explicit mutual commitment to the (prospective) child is necessary to establish
paternal responsibility, why may not even a married man refuse to support his wife's
child? If abortion is simply and solely a feminine prerogative, it would seem difficult
to hold a man responsible.
Sobran, Abortion: Rhetoric and Cultural War, 1 HuMAN Lnw REv. 85, 97 (1975).
Others have voiced the same concern about fairness to the father. One lawyer on the
National Board of the National Organization for Women (NOW) has referred to "discrimina-
tion against a man, who after a casual sexual encounter with a woman (who often has no
access to birth control) finds himself in court, being sued by the Welfare Department, and
faced with eighteen years of supporting a child he didn't plan for or want. He should have no
right, of course, to force the woman to have an abortion; but if he is willing to share the
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dren. Contractual, tort and criminal law analogies to this rationale
existed before the 1973 abortion decisions of Roe v. Wade,' Doe v.
Bolton3 and Jones v. Smith.' The article outlines several holdings
of these decisions and shows how they affect the paternal liability
rationale. In addition, the article illustrates how these holdings un-
dermine the rationale in contractual, tort and criminal law analo-
gies. Examination of the analogies shows why the elimination of
paternal liability may be not only logically necessary, but also an
equitable policy under certain articulated premises. The article
demonstrates why the contemporary removal of paternal liability
would not contradict the logic behind any liability that may have
attached to fathers when abortion was originally legal prior to any
abortion legislation. Finally, it contends that recognition of any
abortion veto for the father is one appropriate response to the chal-
lenge to paternal liability for child support presented by abortion
on maternal demand.
THE Li LrITY RATIONALE
The imposition of liability for child support upon private per-
sons is usually considered a function of a state's parens patriae
power. It is presumed pursuant to the exercise of this power that
resident minors are state wards in whom the government has an
interest.' Part of this state interest is to ensure that children are
cared for adequately without becoming public charges. As a result,
the duty to support children falls on private persons.
Placing the burden of child support upon private persons was
defended by Justice Stone as necessary "in order that children
might not become public charges." 6 Benjamin Cardozo agreed that
the property of an absconding husband or father could be seized if
the man left a "wife or child likely to become charges on the pub-
financial responsibility of an abortion and the woman refuses to have one, then he should
not be forced to support the child." K. DECRow, SEXIST JusTIcE 230 (1974).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
4. 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974).
5. See Geary v. Geary, 102 Neb. 511, 167 N.W. 778 (1918), error dismissed, 251 U.S.
535 (1919).
6. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 221 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 9
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lic.'" It also has been generally regarded as sound public policy to
require courts to guard the rights of minors "and take due precau-
tions to prevent their becoming a public charge."8 Reflecting this
concern, the Supreme Court of Missouri commented: "It is essential
to the welfare of the state that infants be fed, clothed, lodged, and
educated; and also that the state shall not be burdened with their
care."' But precisely why should parents, especially fathers, be the
private persons so burdened?
As early as 1903 the Supreme Court held that a father's "obliga-
tion to support his children during their minority" survived even his
bankruptcy.'0 It was not surprising therefore that twenty years later
it could be noted that in the United States parents were by the great
weight of judicial opinion under a legal duty to maintain their legiti-
mate minor children." This parental obligation did not depend
upon any statutory duty of support."
The ultimate source of this duty was defined in various ways.
Responsibility of fathers or of both parents for infant children's
upkeep has been based on "the law of nature;"'3 similar justifica-
tions have alluded to "natural law"" or "natural right"' 5 and "natu-
ral duty"'" or "natural obligation."" Child support duties also have
been deemed a moral obligation.'"
7. Coler v. Corn Exch. Bank, 250 N.Y. 136, 139, 164 N.E. 882, 883 (1928), aff'd 280 U.S.
218 (1930).
8. Willits v. Willits, 76 Neb. 228, 230, 107 N.W. 379, 380 (1906).
9. State v. Thornton, 232 Mo. 298, 305, 134 S.W. 519, 521 (1911).
10. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340, 352 (1903).
11. Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 584, 211 P. 619, 619 (1923). See also Denning v.
Star Pub. Co., 94 Ind. App. 300, 180 N.E. 685 (1932); Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d
31 (1947).
12. See note 11 supra.
13. Fulton v. Fulton, 52 Ohio St. 229, 237, 39 N.E. 729, 731 (1895).
14. Denning v. Star Pub. Co., 94 Ind. App. 300, 308, 180 N.E. 685, 687 (1932).
15. Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 620, 44 S.E.2d 31, 34 (1947).
16. Pretzinger v. Pretzinger, 45 Ohio St. 452, 458, 15 N.E. 471, 473 (1887). See also
Spencer v. Spencer, 97 Minn. 56, 105 N.W. 483 (1906).
17. Thayer v. Thayer, 189 N.C. 502, 507, 127 S.E. 553, 555 (1925). See also Osborn v.
Weatherford, 27 Ala. App. 258, 170 So. 95 (1936); Crain v. Mallone, 130 Ky. 125, 113 S.W.
67 (1908).
18. Osborn v. Weatherford, 27 Ala. App. 258, 260, 170 So. 95, 96 (1936); Fulton v.
Fulton, 52 Ohio St. 229, 237, 39 N.E. 729, 731 (1895). See also State v. Thornton, 232 Mo.
298, 134 S.W. 519 (1911).
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Precisely why any such moral or natural claims existed (let
alone were enforceable at law) was seldom rendered explicit in judi-
cial opinions. The obligation was "often accepted as a matter of
course without the assignment of any reason."'" Indeed, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals confessed in 1923 that although the
legal burden of supporting his infant children fell upon a father, the
authorities were "not agreed as to the principle upon which a father
can be held liable." 2
The Supreme Court noted that motherhood is of course a "bio-
logical relationship."'" It is on such a rationale that both parents
were held liable to their (at least legitimate) children in most in-
stances in which courts enunciated their premises. 22 The Supreme
Court of Iowa cited one source as follows: "'The duty of parents to
support, protect, and educate their offspring is founded upon the
nature of the connection between them.' ",23 After all, the Supreme
Court of Kansas observed: "A sufficient reason for holding parents
to be under a legal obligation, apart from any statute, to support
their legitimate child while it is too young to care for itself, is that
the liability ought to attach as a part of their responsibility for
having brought it into being."2'
It was similarly determined: "The obligation of progenitors to
support their offspring is universally acknowledged."" The Ohio
Supreme Court quoted an early commentator for the contention
that parents must support their offspring due" 'to the implied obli-
gation which parents assume in entering into wedlock and bringing
19. Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 584, 211 P. 619, 619 (1923). See also Barrett v.
Barrett, 44 Ariz. 509, 39 P.2d 621 (1934); Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947).
20. Maschauer v. Downs, 289 F. 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See also Worthington v.
Worthington, 212 Mo. App. 216, 253 S.W. 443 (1923).
21. Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968).
22. The following has been theorized relative to artificial insemination donors: "It is
most likely that the donor will be held to be the legal parent in such cases inasmuch as he is,
after all, the biological parent." Wadlington, Artificial Insemination: The Dangers of a Poorly
Kept Secret, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 777, 792 (1970). From a different perspective, the biological
relationship is also important: "Generally a husband is not liable to support a child born to
his wife but not procreated by him." Note, The Legal Status of Artificial Insemination, 19
DRAKE L. REv. 409, 430 (1970).
23. Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 154, 44 N.W. 295, 296 (1890)(emphasis added).
24. Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 585, 211 P. 619, 620 (1923)(emphasis added).
25. Denning v. Star Pub. Co., 94 Ind. App. 300, 308, 180 N.E. 685, 687 (1932)(emphasis
added).
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children into the world.' "26 Other judicial opinion added: "The fa-
ther, who has brought life into this world, must make a manly effort
to support it, and if he does not do so he is guilty under the law. '"21
Logically implicit in all of these passages is the voluntary na-
ture of the father's biological relationship to his child. As the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin recalled as recently as 1968: "A father's
duty to support his child rests upon not only moral law but legally
upon the voluntary status of parenthood which the father as-
sumed."2 8
This biological fact of the father voluntarily bestowing life has
long been asserted as a prerequisite before liability for maintenance
of the child attaches to its parent.2 9 In 1756 William Blackstone
wrote in the first volume of his Commentaries:
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their
children, is a principle of natural law; an obligation laid on
them not only by nature itself, but by their own proper act,
in bringing them into the world; for they would be in the
highest manner injurious to their issue, if they only gave
their children life, that they might afterwards see them
perish. By begetting them, therefore, they have entered into
a voluntary obligation, to endeavor, as far as in them lies,
that the life which they have bestowed shall be supported
and preserved. Thus the children will have a perfect right
of receiving maintenance from their parents.30
This passage has been quoted with approval by the supreme courts
of Kansas, 3' Arizona 32 and North Carolina.3
26. Fulton v. Fulton, 52 Ohio St. 229, 237, 39 N.E. 729, 731 (1895)(emphasis added).
27. Hunter v. State, 10 Okla. Crim. 119, 126, 134 P. 1134, 1138 (1913)(emphasis added).
28. Niesen v. Niesen, 38 Wis. 2d 599, 602, 157 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1968).
29. However, the biological relationship test for fixing support duties might itself be
irrational. Mr. Justice Harlan implied as much in a 1968 dissent. Glona v. American Guaran-
tee Co., 391 U.S. 73, 79-80 (1968)(Harlan, J., dissenting). See KRAUSE, ILLEGITMACY: LAW AND
SociAL POLICY 69 (1971).
30. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIFS *447 (emphasis added). The assertion long ante-
dates Blackstone, who apparently drew directly upon a work of the previous century. See 4
PUFFENDORF, LAW OF NATuRE AND NATIONS, ch. 11, § 4 (1688).
31. Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 585, 211 P. 619, 620 (1923).
32. Barrett v. Barrett, 44 Ariz. 509, 512, 39 P.2d 621, 623 (1934).
33. Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 618, 44 S.E.2d 31, 33 (1947).
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The crucial significance of the voluntary bestowal of life by the
father is highlighted by pre-1973 thinking concerning the heterolo-
gous artificial insemination donor (A.I.D.). The voluntary nature of
the role of these fathers is blatant: donors generally are paid.34 If the
heterologous A.I.D. child of a married mother is considered illegiti-
mate, the donor-father, not the mother's husband (at least when the
husband is non-consenting), would be seemingly responsible for the
child's support.3 5 While-at least as of the early 1970's-there ap-
pear to be no cases exactly on this point,3 it has been asserted that
placing responsibility for the child's support on the donor-father
would in principle be a desirable result7.3
Such reasoning reaffirms the overriding import of the voluntary
role of the father as a partner in biological creation. In the esoteric
A.I.D. context more than in the everyday paternity suit, it is demon-
strated that neither marriage, acknowledgement, subsidy or custody
contains the critical element of paternal responsibility. The A.I.D.
father is remote from any of those elements. Only his role as a
voluntary and immediate biological creator exists, but this latter
role suffices to encompass the pre-1973 elements of paternal support
liability.
Although case discussions indicate that the voluntary assump-
tion of a biological relationship seems the strongest argument justi-
fying paternal responsibility for child support, this basis for the
duty under Anglo-American legal tradition emphatically is not self-
evident. The father of bastards has usually entered voluntarily into
the biological relationship with them. Nevertheless
[T]he common law with almost uniform consistency
treated an offspring of parents not married to each other as
nullius filius-the son of no one-of no father and no
mother. That is to say, it closed its eyes to the fact of that
relation and in legal aspect ignored its existence. 38
34. See Rice, A.I.D. - An Heir of Controversy, 34 NoTE DAME LAW. 510, 519 (1959).
35. Note, The Legal Status of Artificial Insemination, supra note 22, at 430.
36. Wadlington, supra note 22, at 792.
37. Rice, supra note 34, at 519.
38. Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 584, 211 P. 619, 619 (1923). "At early English
common law, the illegitimate was a stranger to its parents, neither owing it any duty of
support." Comment, Illegitimates - Father's Duty To Support, 28 N.C.L. REv. 119, 120-21
(1949).
[Vol. 9
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Nor is this general outlook ancient history. Even in 1968 Texas and
Idaho statutes made no provision for the support of illegitimate
children.3 Indeed, one view sustained by early cases in some Ameri-
can states and in England was that parents had no legal obligation
to support even, apparently, legitimate children. 0 These circum-
stances all provide the caveat that the paternal liability question is
in theory not a definitively settled matter. A fresh look at the ques-
tion is appropriate as pervasive legal abortion becomes routine for
the first time.
THE TRADITIONAL CONTRACTUAL PARALLEL
The pre-1973 common law obligation of a father to support his
infant children was apparently to be distinguished from a contrac-
tual obligation. In Buchanan v. Buchanan," the Virginia Supreme
Court held that parental rights and duties could not be altered by
contract. 2 Despite this holding, child support claims prior to 1973
were analogous to contractual claims.
A promise which a promisor (parent) should reasonably expect
to induce action (growth) on the part of a promisee or third party
(child) and which does induce such action is binding if justice can
be achieved only by enforcement of the promise. In the typical pre-
1973 support controversy the child was in a position analogous to
that of the plaintiff third party in such a contracts case." Although
39. CLARK, THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNrED STATES 162 n.4 (1968).
"Cases abound commenting that the father has no duty to support his illegitimate children
except as provided by statute, that such statutes are to be strictly construed, and that the
rights and remedies they provide are exclusive." Comment, Illegitimates - Father's Duty to
Support, supra note 38, at 119 (citing numerous cases). But see Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535 (1973), holding that discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children under a
Texas statute providing support obligations of biological fathers denied illegitimate children
equal protection of the laws.
40. See Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 619, 44 S.E.2d 31, 34 (1947).
41. Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va. 458, 197 S.E. 426 (1938).
42. Id. at 459, 197 S.E. at 434.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1973).
44. The logic of this kind of third party beneficiary claim has long been appreciated:
[I]f the relation between two contracting parties has been followed by consequences
to others; if it has placed third parties in any peculiar position, or, as in the case of
marriage, has even called third parties into existence, obligations arise on the part
of both the contracting parties towards those third persons, the fulfillment of which,
or at all events the mode of fulfillment, must be greatly affected by the continuance
or disruption of the relation between the original parties to the contract.
Swan: Abortion on Maternal Demand: Paternal Support Liability Implicati
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used in a different context, this contractual analogy had been used
before 1973 in an argument relative to abortion:
If one is aware of the nature of human sexual intercourse
as a potentially life-giving act of love-making, there is "an
implicit promise to life made in the sexual act." Intercourse
freely engaged in means that a "promise-making situation
exists, realized or not." The promise made is not to the
fetus as such but to the future person that is begun."
The deeds of the promisors (both parents) had inevitably led the
third person beneficiary (child) to the status of a helpless person in
need of support.
The fact that the only "promises" of the parents in the classic
child support instance were their deeds in begetting and bearing the
child makes it no less analogous to a contractual promise. The fact
that the promise must be implied by these deeds does not defeat the
analogy because actually "all contracts are implied contracts" inso-
far as meanings are "found by a process of implication and infer-
ence."
46
Since abortion was generally prohibited before 1973, the birth
MiL, ON LBERTY 61 (1921).
This passage from John Stuart Mill was being quoted in the marriage contract context
as late as last year. See Fleischmann, Marriage by Contract, 8 FAM. L.Q. 27, 49 n.68 (1974).
45. Ramsey, Reference Points in Deciding About Abortion, in MoRALrry OF ABORTION
60, 80 (Noonan ed. 1970), quoting Green, Abortion and Promise-Keeping, CRIusTIANTrY &
Ciusis, May 15, 1967. Before 1973 it was similarly supposed that the marriage contract "might
be viewed as a third-party beneficiary contract by which the father prospectively confers
legitimacy on all children resulting from the marriage. Other situations in which the law
permits a choice as to whether to grant or withhold benefits superficially seem to support this
focus on the father's consent." KRAUSE, supra note 29, at 78-79.
Even since Roe and Doe one sociologist has discussed in greater detail the contractual
implications of abortion. Concerning purely voluntary consensual intercourse, for example,
this scholar contends that
a contractual relationship is implied, for if a child is born of that union, the male
partner may be assigned the responsibilities of support of the child and/or its mother.
In a just and reasonable society, rights and responsibilities occur in tandem. Has not
a man who is legally liable for the consequences of his participation in sexual inter-
course by mutual consent, an equal right in the determination of whether the natural
consequences of that act shall be terminated by abortion?
Lincoln, Why I Reversed My Stand On Laissez-Faire Abortion, CmisTAN CENTURY, April 25,
1973, at 478.
46. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 18 (1963).
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of a child was an outcome naturally implied in the event of impreg-
nation. Courts thus were able to infer logically that the action of the
unborn in growing to term was an outcome implied in the typical
parents' mutual consent to beget and conceive." By nearly universal
accord, justice could be achieved only by allowing the child a main-
tenance claim against both parents. So pronounced was this convic-
tion before 1973 that a mother's advance waiver of any paternity
action against an A.I.D. father was believed to be of doubtful valid-
ity even though such fathers have little connection with the child."
The logic of the implied contract for child support had gone
even further before 1973 and attached liability to nonfathers on the
basis of this reasoning."9 Several cases held that consenting hus-
bands who had acquiesced in their wives' successful impregnation
by heterologous A.I.D. fathers were liable for child support on im-
plied contractual grounds.50
THE TRADITIONAL TORT PARALLEL
The pre-1973 claim of an infant or of his third party guardian
for maintenance expenses was long analogous to tort claims. Proxi-
mate cause-an essential element of any plaintiff's cause of action
in tort-is the reasonable connection between the act or omission of
the defendant and the damage claimed by the plaintiff." In the
classic tort analogy, impregnation and carrying the child to term
would be deeds of a father and mother creating liability to their
child-plaintiff. Since abortion was prohibited in most situations
prior to 1973, the father's impregnation of the mother set into play
the chain of causation substantially certain to climax in the birth
of the child in need of maintenance. It is well settled in civil cases
47. In 1974 one author commented:
We must remember that until a few years ago, abortion was a tremendously impor-
tant step involving much planning and expense, a trip to another state or to another
country, consultations with clergymen and lawyers, examinations by boards of physi-
cians. Many people shared in the decision to abort.
Adler, Abortion - The Need To Change Jewish Law, SH'MA: A JOURNAL OF JEWISH
RESPONSI5mm, Nov. 15, 1974, at 163, 164.
48. See Wadlington, supra note 22, at 792.
49. Note, The Legal Status of Artificial Insemination, 19 DRAKE L. Rav. 409,431 (1970).
The reasoning is that of the Restatement of Contracts. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs
§ 90 (1) (1973).
50. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 41 Misc. 2d 886, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1964); Gursky v.
Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1963).
51. W. PROSsER, LAw OF ToRTs § 41 (4th ed. 1971).
19751
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that if two persons act in concert each is liable for the entire result
if it is tortious.52
THE TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL PARALLEL
Criminal liability for nonsupport of children was imposed upon
parents by statute in all jurisdictions at least as early as 1936.13 The
rationale for this pre-1973 criminal liability was analogous to that
of criminal liability in other contexts. "The notion long persisted"
in homicide, for example, "that the way to decide all questions of
proximate cause was to have the jury find the defendant guilty of
homicide if death was a 'natural and probable consequence' of his
act."" But courts turned away from this test toward instead exam-
ining "how much of the original force launched by defendant was
still present and contributing to the death at the moment of its
occurrence."" When abortion was prohibited, a father's original
impregnation of the mother launched a pregnancy usually ending in
childbirth. It was consistent in both life-generating and life-taking
matters for the law to hold men liable for outcomes of which their
deeds were the proximate cause.
THE INTERVENTION OF Roe, Doe AND Jones
Roe v. Wade" and Doe v. Bolton 7 effectively remove the prohi-
bitions on abortion. In so doing, these cases call into question father-
child relationships.
The Supreme Court held in Roe that an unborn child is not
legally a person." Although it declined to ascertain when life be-
gins," the Court did refer to cases in which property interests of
unborn children were held to be contingent upon live birth or in
which parents of a stillborn child maintained a wrongful death ac-
tion on the basis of prenatal injuries.' 0 The Court believed that these
52. Id. at § 52.
53. 4 Vim R, AMEmCAN FAmILY LAwS 60 (1936).
54. Comment, Causal Relation Between Defendant's Unlawful Act and the Death, 31
MiH. L. Rav. 659, 661 (1933).
55. Id.
56. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
57. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
58. 410 U.S. at 158.
59. Id. at 159.
60. Id. at 162.
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cases indicate "that the fetus, at most, represents only the poten-
tiality of life." 6' Basing its decision on a mother's right of privacy, 2
the Court held that abortion during approximately the first trimes-
ter of pregnancy is to be left to the medical judgment of the mother's
physician. 63 During the next trimester, the state is allowed to regu-
late abortion "in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health.""4
Mr. Justice Douglas proclaimed that "the clear message" of
Roe and Doe is "that a woman is free to make the basic decision
whether to bear an unwanted child."65 However, the Court expressly
reserved comment on what are "the father's rights, if any exist in
the constitutional context, in the abortion decision."" This failure
to decide the father's rights left open the way for the 1973 and 1974
decisions67 that fathers cannot prevent mothers from having an
abortion.
Legal personality is therefore not the product of the joint con-
ception of a child by two parents. Conception-indeed, conception
plus pregnancy until just before childbirth-produces no new person
as a matter of fundamental constitutional law. Nor legally is life
even necessarily the product of the joint action by two parents.
Legal personality is only conferred by a baby being born of a woman
who is free to make the basic decision whether to bear or abort.
Absent subsequent Supreme Court recognition of a father's abortion
veto equal to the mother's, the decision to convert the nonperson of
pregnancy into a person-with the legal demands for support such
an infant person can enforce-is exclusively the mother's.
Jones v. Smith," a Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal
opinion, is examined here because it apparently presented that
61. Id.
62. Id. at 155.
63. Id. at 164.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 214 (Douglas, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 165 n.67.
67. Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2246
(1974); Doe v.. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973); Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339
(Fla. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974); Doe v. Doe, - Mass.__, 314 N.E.2d
128 (1974).
68. 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974).
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court with a matter of first impression in the nation"9 relative to
paternal rights of adult unwed fathers in the abortion decision. The
Jones court cited Roe and Doe in asserting that the essential and
underlying factor in its own decision was the maternal right of pri-
vacy.7 0
In Jones a putative father sued to restrain the mother from
having an abortion. The court denied the father any legal veto over
the abortion.7 Since the justices unanimously believed it to be
unquestioned that a woman has a fundamental right to decide
whether or not to bear a child, they reasoned that granting a pater-
nal veto would be inconsistent with the maternal right to privacy."
The Jones opinion is forthright in its view of the overriding
impact of the privacy claim, finding the decision to abort "one that
is purely personal to the mother and between her and the attending
physician. . . ."13 In light of the paternal claim the opinion adds:
"The right of privacy is a right that is purely personal to the individ-
ual asserting such right.""
Jones, in defining the scope of a mother's privacy, carefully
detached the right of privacy relative to abortion from the joint act
of conception. The court stated:
The appellant contends that whatever right of privacy that
the mother might have enjoyed, such right was "waived"
by virtue of her consent to and participation in the sex act.
This argument is somewhat tenuous. The right of privacy
of the mother with respect to a termination of pregnancy as
delineated by the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court is a right separate and apart from any act of concep-
tion."
To the extent that duties correlate to rights, a right separate and
69. "The novel issue, therefore, is whether an unmarried father has any legally enforce-
able interest in the birth of his illegitimate child." Cuneo, What Rights for the Unwed
Father?, The Indianapolis Star, April 8, 1973.
70. 278 So. 2d at 341.
71. Id. at 344.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 341 (emphasis in the original).
74. Id. at 342 (emphasis in the original).
75. Id. at 342-43.
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apart from any act of conception might seem to imply that the
corresponding duty is also independent of conception. But after
conception only the mother of the two parents has a right in procrea-
tion under Jones. Who of the two parents after conception, then,
should suffer any duty attendant to procreation?
Reaffirming "that the decision to terminate pregnancy predi-
cated upon the right of privacy is not vitiated by participation in
the sex act,"7 the Jones court refused to recognize any paternal
rights relative to abortion. It saw so little merit in the paternal claim
to any right in the abortion decision-even when the father sug-
gested his own health would suffer from the abortion 77-that the
court alluded to his "right" in quotation marks, as if reluctant to
concede it was a serious proposition.7"
Another 1973 decision looking to the .maternal privacy right,
Doe v. Rampton,7 declared unconstitutional a statute guaranteeing
a paternal veto in the abortion decision. 0 One judge, in evaluating
paternal rights, found that the maternal right of privacy is "funda-
mental, and lesser interests or rights themselves deemed fundamen-
tal in another context may not be allowed to interfere or impose an
undue burden upon the woman's right of privacy."'" Decisions dur-
ing 1974 that looked to the maternal privacy right also negated
paternal veto claims. In Coe v. Gerstein,8 2 Florida's statutory re-
quirement for spousal consent to abortion was attacked as being
violative of maternal privacy. Citing Roe and Doe,83 the court found
in Coe that the statutory spousal consent requirement was unconsti-
tutional. 4
In Doe v. Doe, 5 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
refused to recognize the claim of an estranged husband-father that
76. Id. at 343.
77. Id. at 340.
78. Id. at 340, 343, 344. The paternal "right" has been written of similarly elsewhere.
Uda, Abortion Law: Roe v. Wade and the Montana Dilemma, 35 MoNT. L. REV. 103, 106 n.33
(1974).
79. 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973).
80. Id. at 199.
81. Id. at 203 (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2246 (1974).
83. Id. at 696.
84. Id. at 698.
85. - Mass. -, 314 N.E.2d 128 (1974).
1975l
Swan: Abortion on Maternal Demand: Paternal Support Liability Implicati
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1975
256 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
he had a constitutional right to determine that his unborn child not
be aborted.8 6 The conception in Doe v. Doe had been jointly desired,
and the wife previously had expressed sentiments against abortion.87
Since the wife's health was good, she would have run little risk in
childbirth. 8 When the wife indicated that she desired an abortion,
the husband brought suit and testified that he desired to assume
custody of the child, to support it and to arrange for its care, includ-
ing day care by the wife's sister.8 The court, citing Roe and Doe,"
nevertheless found that the father had no veto over abortion en-
forceable by the courts."
These decisions denying a paternal veto over abortion under-
mine the various justifications given by courts for holding fathers
liable for their children's care. The father's coequal generative rela-
tionship no longer has a legal counterpart: though the potential
person is half his genetically, it is yet exclusively under the mother's
dominion legally as well as physically until birth. No longer can a
court seriously allege that the "nature of the connection" between
father and child has "brought it into being". Legally, the per-
son-perhaps arguably the life itself-was created independently of
the father's act or omission. A father is now a "progenitor" who has
"brought life into this world" only in some zoological sense. His
legal status relative to his unborn children is that of a helpless
bystander.
THE CONTEMPORARY CONTRACTUAL PARALLEL
After the 1973 and 1974 decisions giving a woman the freedom
to decide whether to have an abortion and denying the father any
veto over that decision, it is no longer accurate to assert from a
contract analogy that an infant-plaintiffs position is like that of a
third party beneficiary to a contract affirmed between its parents.
Such an analogy would be inaccurate as to any but pregnancies
surrounded by extraordinary circumstances. The general rule as to
third party beneficiaries provides:
86. Id. at , 314 N.E.2d at 133.
87. Id. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 129.
88. Id. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 130.
89. Id. at , 314 N.E.2d at 129.
90. Id. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 131.
91. Id. at , 314 N.E.2d at 133.
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A third party who is not a promisee and who gave no consid-
eration has an enforceable right by reason of a contract
made by two others (1) if he is a creditor of the promisee
or of some other person and the contract calls for a perform-
ance by the promisor in satisfaction of the obligation; or (2)
if the promised performance will be of pecuniary benefit to
him and the contract is so expressed as to give the promisor
reason to know that such benefit is contemplated by the
promisee as one of the motivating causes of his making the
contract. 2
The infant is not a creditor of his father. Neither is it true that the
procreation and nurture of children is often expressly contemplated
by one sexual partner 3 as a motivating cause of consent to inter-
course." In the absence of express contemplation of the third party
benefit, the claim of an infant as third party beneficiary should
collapse. As Corbin explains, "Of course, the defendant should not
be compelled to render a performance that he did not promise to
render-to pay a bill that he did not promise to pay."' 5
After 1973, express contemplation of child support seems neces-
sary to make the child a third party beneficiary to the parental
"contract" to create and support an infant. An implied contract can
no longer be found when fathers beget children because post-1973
pregnancy is simply an occasion for the unilateral decision of the
woman whether or not to bear the child. Since this decision is uni-
lateral, the responsibility logically must be unilateral in a contract
92. 4 A. CORBIN, CoNTRACTs § 776 (1963).
93. Procreation and nurture of children is seldom expressly contemplated by sex part-
ners:
Indeed many pregnancies can without great difficulty be assimilated to the hard case,
for how often do persons undertake an act of sexual intercourse consciously intending
that a child be the fruit of that act? Many pregnancies are unspecified by particular
intent, are unplanned, are in this sense involuntary.
J. NOONAN, How To ARotu ABouT ABoRION 6 (1974).
It has been held that even a mother's later failure to abort cannot be considered a
necessary indication of prior intent to conceive. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp.
367, 375 n.6 (E.D. Va. 1974).
94. In adultery, for example, the biological father makes no promise to pay the support
bill: "Adultery is committed solely for sexual gratification and is completed by an act of
physical intercourse." Smith, Artificial Insemination - No Longer a Quagmire, 3 FAM. L.Q.
1, 4 (1969)(emphasis added).
95. 4 A. CORmN, CoNTRAcTS § 776 (1963).
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analogy because it is the decision-at least implied-to consent
upon which contractual duties are founded.
United States Senator Birch Bayh appears to have anticipated
this logical conclusion during a September 12, 1974, hearing of the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee. An exchange between the Senator and a proponent
of abortion, Pamela Lowry, was described as follows:
Bayh mentioned a "strong legal precedent that all of
us human beings, who are in command of our mental ca-
pacities, have to be responsible for our own actions."
As part of her response, Ms. Lowry said, "I think it
would be too facile to say someone who willingly partici-
pates in sexual intercourse willingly accepted the preg-
nancy."
The senator retorted, "You are going to get yourself in
some hot water because if that is true of the mother, then
is it not also true of the father, and where do you impose a
responsibility of the father to care for the children? I don't
think you want to get yourself in a position where you sug-
gest two adults who participated in a sexual activity don't
bear responsibility for that very human, wholesome activ-
ity.9
Even where an implied contract is deemed to exist between the
two parents in a pregnancy, good policy in contract law would find
the post-1973 father liable only for his share of the expense of the
immediate result of the impregnation, i.e., the expense of the preg-
nancy itself or of an abortion. To hold the father liable for twenty
years of costs after childbirth is to impose a liability for which his
remote conduct is not the proximate cause by contract standards.
Causation requirements in contract law are designed to pro-
mote two goals. The first is the social policy of minimizing future
damages; and the second is the social policy of discouraging self-
help. Corbin sets out these goals as follows:
Not only must a causal relation be shown to exist between
96. Hartle, Pro-abortionists testify before Bayh committee, NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS,
Nov., 1974, at 12, col. 3.
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the defendant's conduct and the harm for which damages
are sought, but it must also be shown that the defendant's
relation to the harm was sufficiently near in space and time
that compelling him to make reparation will, according to
prevailing opinion, tend appreciably to prevent similar
harms in the future and to prevent aggrieved persons from
attempting to take "justice" into their own hands."
The first goal of contract causation requirements-relating lia-
bility to prevention of future similar harm-is a goal under which
the modern father should be relieved of liability for child support.
If infants are free to sue fathers as well as mothers for maintenance,
society's pregnant mothers will be more financially free to create
future "harms" (the "harm" meaning the maintenance need of chil-
dren). If, conversely, infants are allowed only to sue mothers for
maintenance, society's future mothers will be discouraged from pro-
ducing infants in need of support. They instead will be encouraged
to exercise their constitutional abortion right. This assuredly will
reduce similar "harms" in the future.
The second goal of contract causation requirements-relating
liability to the prevention of self-help-is also a goal under which
the modern father should be relieved of liability for child support.
If fathers are no longer liable for child support, mothers still remain
vulnerable to a child's maintenance claim. Since the infant-
plaintiff's entire claim is still collectible from its mother, the infant
has no self-help incentive at all.
In Jones, the unwed father suggested the existence of an im-
plied contract between the parents manifested by the father's agree-
ment to support the child if the mother conceived and by the
woman's consent to intercourse and her representations that she
would marry the father." The opinion firmly denies the existence of
this alleged contract. Even if the father undertook to provide for his
child, such provision "does not serve as a basis upon which to estab-
lish a 'contractual agreement' of such legal and enforceable signifi-
cance as to prevent a termination of pregnancy otherwise permissi-
ble."99
97. 5 A. CORBIN, CoNTRACrs § 997 (1963).
98. 278 So. 2d at 343.
99. Id. at 344. It is interesting that an obvious legal framework in which an implied
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Contract law reasoning has also been used to suggest that a
father may have a property interest in the fetus that cannot be
defeated unilaterally by the mother. Viewing the decisions legaliz-
ing abortion as reducing the fetus to a chattel, one attorney stated:
• . .The question becomes, therefore: Who owns the chat-
tel?
Obviously, the mother has a claim for possession. Is her
ownership exclusive and absolute? It would appear that the
father can assert a claim of ownership equal with that of the
mother's, especially where the father is also the husband of
the mother. After all, the fetus is technically the combina-
tion of the female egg with the male sperm, and each contri-
butor is in a position to claim the fetus as personal prop-
erty. Where the contributors are married, the argument is
further strengthened by noting that the birth of children
was contemplated within the scope of the marriage con-
tract, and the parties thereby waived any right to assert
exclusive possession of fetal life conceived during mar-
riage. 100
But this suggestion may have been already outdated when first
proffered. An argument that a fetus is owned jointly by a father and
his wife and so cannot be disposed of by one owner without the
consent of the other was rejected by an Illinois court when a hus-
band sought to enjoin his wife from having an abortion.'
THE CONTEMPORARY TORT PARALLEL
Besides undermining the contract analogy for holding fathers
liable for the support of their infant children, the abortion decisions
bilateral contract between parents to provide for their children as third party beneficiaries
can be found in the Canon Law. Canon 1013 provides: "The primary object of marriage is
the procreation and education of offspring; . . .". S. WoYwooD, THE NEW CANON LAW 205
(1918).
There is sharp contrast between the premises of the Canon Law and of the Supreme
Court relative to domestic relations. This contrast emphasizes the untenability of implied
contractual obligations upon fathers for child support. The Supreme Court is unlikely to
define either sexual relations or the marriage contract using the axioms of the Canon Law,
which axioms would embrace the implied obligation.
100. Orloski, Legal Questions and Legislative Alternatives, AMERICA, Aug. 10, 1974, at
50, 51, cols. 2-3.
101. Pound v. Pound (Ill. Cir. Jan. 31, 1974), in 42 U.S.L.W. 2456 (Mar. 5, 1974).
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of 1973 and 1974 also undermine the use of the tort analogy as a
basis for imposing paternal liability for child support. A defendant
in a tort case would not be held liable to a plaintiff if the defendant
were a bystander analogous to the post-1973 father. In relation to
negligence, for example, a valid defense is that of shifting responsi-
bility. According to this defense, "the defendant may not be re-
quired to take any precautions for the plaintiff's safety, because he
is free to assume that someone else will do it or will be fully responsi-
ble in case he does not."'' 0 Since a woman has nearly absolute free-
dom as to abortion, the father-defendant would not in a tort analogy
be liable for the child-plaintiff's care because he is free to assume
that the mother will care for it or will be fully responsible for its
maintenance. A father's freedom to expect the exercise of such re-
sponsibility by the mother arises because the creation of the person-
plaintiff and its liabilities is an intimate, months-long process in
which the father is denied even a veto.
This outcome is a striking one, but Prosser suggests a somewhat
parallel example in his discussion of proximate cause. Prosser ex-
plains that when a defendant-created danger is passed on by a third
party, responsibility would shift from the defendant "if the third
party were notified of the danger in advance, and then elected to
proceed.' ' 0 3 This is the situation with post-1973 mothers and fa-
thers. A legally competent mother is certainly notified of her preg-
nancy no later than the second trimester. She also usually under-
stands the danger of incurring liability to the child for support upon
childbirth. If she elects to proceed anyway, the fact that a
defendant-father's deed played an initial physical role in the process
is of no legal effect because responsibility has shifted from him.
The factors weighed in deciding whether responsibility shifts °10
all aid the argument against imposing liability for child support
upon fathers via the tort analogy. These factors include the reliabil-
ity and competence of the party relied upon and her understanding
of the situation. Few women would be unable to comprehend their
pregnancies. Fewer still would be unable to understand and respond
to their pregnancies during a period extending over six months.
102. W. PossE, LAW op ToRS § 33 (4th ed. 1971).
103. Id. at § 44.
104. Id. at § 33.
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After a woman becomes cognizant of her pregnancy, only a calcu-
lated decision for childbirth explains any rejection (on whatever
grounds) of abortion.
Other relevant shifting responsibility factors include the seri-
ousness of the danger and number of persons likely to be affected.
No exceptions to the shifting of responsibility from father to mother
in the abortion analogy arise from consideration of these factors. 05
Another factor weighed is the length of time elapsed, which is some
six months for the abortion decision. Factors finally important for
shifting responsibility are the likelihood that "proper care" will not
be used and the ease with which the original defendant himself may
take precautions. Both of these factors also indicate that a shift of
responsibility is appropriate in the abortion context. The likelihood
that proper care will not be used is a possibility only if the typical
woman deliberately refrains for months from deciding to abort. As
to the ease with which the original defendant himself may take
precautions, it has been seen that once the mother is impregnated
the father is practically helpless to take precautions.
The time element for the tort doctrine of shifting responsibility
was clarified by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1958. In
Greenwood v. Lyler & Buckner, Inc. ,'0 a dangerous highway condi-
tion caused by a contractor's original negligence but tolerated by the
state highway department resulted in third-party injury seven
months after acceptance of the completed work.' The court held
that the contractor was not liable since responsibility had shifted to
the highway department.' 8
The policy need to protect the lives of the entire road-using
public from a contractor's particular act of negligence clearly out-
weighs the policy need to protect a solitary infant's claim for sup-
105. Prosser warns of extreme dangers or special relations in which the shifting of
responsibility is barred as a policy matter. But, all the examples he cites involve extreme
social dangers, such as inflammable stove polish, inflammable beauty shop combs, gasoline
in kerosene cans or highly dangerous rented autos. Id. at § 44.
106. Greenwood v. Lyler & Buckner, Inc., 329 P.2d 1063 (Okla. 1958). See also Goar v.
Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228, 196 N.W. 171 (1923). Distinguishable is Murphy v. Barlow
Realty Co., 206 Minn. 527, 289 N.W. 563 (1939), because the second party in Murphy could
not reasonably have been expected to prevent liability to a third.
107. 329 P.2d at 1064.
108. Id. at 1067.
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port against a father's particular act of "negligence." In both instan-
ces a second party would reasonably be expected to guard against
the potential claims of third parties. Moreover, a six or seven month
failure on the part of the second party to guard against such liability
to third parties exists in both instances. Responsibility shifted in the
contractor case. As a result, responsibility must also shift in a con-
sistent abortion analogy.
Also important in the tort analogy is the concept of duty. It is
useful to state every proximate cause question in the following form:
Was defendant under a duty to protect the plaintiff against this
harm?'09 As a defense against liability for prenatal injuries, it was
traditional for defendants to claim that no duty could be owed to a
nonexistent person-the unborn."0 While this defense collapsed be-
tween 1946 and 1967' because prenatal existence became legally
recognized, it is apt in the child support analogy.
At the time of impregnation a father has no present duty to-
ward the postnatal person. Such a person does not yet exist at
conception. Since the "tort" upon which support is demanded-the
grant of postnatal life to the child-is exactly that grant over which
a father has no control after 1973, a paternal duty to support the
child does not arise after conception either. A man cannot equitably
have a duty to act where he is conclusively denied freedom to act.
Without a duty, there can be no proximate cause of the harm and
so no tort liability.
The tort doctrine of the last clear chance is also instructive in
the abortion analogy. When there is injury to a third-party plaintiff,
a co-defendant who had the last clear chance to avoid the harm may
be required to indemnify the other co-defendant."2 Inthe abortion
analogy, the child as third-party plaintiff might arguably sue both
parents as co-defendants in an action for support. The mother, as
the co-defendant having the last clear chance, ought to be required
to indemnify the father.
109. W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs § 42 (4th ed. 1971).
110. Id. at § 55.
111. Id.
112. Colorado & Southern R. Co. v. Western Light & Power Co., 73 Colo. 107, 214 P.
30 (1923); Nashua Iron & Steel Co. v. Worcester & N. R. Co., 62 N.H. 159 (1882); Knippen-
berg v. Lord & Taylor, 193 App. Div. 753, 184 N.Y.S. 785 (1920). See also Cuneo, supra note
69. But, dictum to the contrary exists. See W. PROssER, LAW OF ToRTs § 66 (4th ed. 1971).
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THE CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL PARALLEL
As with the contract and tort analogies, the criminal law anal-
ogy now also cannot serve as a basis for holding fathers liable for
child support. A criminal defendant would not be held liable if that
defendant were a bystander analogous to the post-1973 father. Even
assuming that the physical cause-and-effect of impregnation makes
the father's original act one cause among others resulting in the
child, the father cannot be held liable in a criminal analogy for more
than limited consequences of his act.
If criminal defendant A's felonious assault gives B a serious
wound, B's negligence will not release A from liability should B die
from the wound, even if B would have recovered but for B's own
neglect."13 But if A's felonious assault causes only a minor wound,
the result is different. While the law will follow the consequences of
A's acts through even B's failure to secure treatment, "the limits of
liability are rather quickly reached.""' The microscopic reality of
fertilization parallels the minor wound. As a result, childbirth creat-
ing decades of maintenance liabilities is palpably beyond any
"quickly reached" bound of the legal consequences of the father's
act of impregnation. The mother's failure to abort during the long
period of pregnancy makes the childbirth result not proximate to
but remote from the father's role.
The hypothetical criminal case is not distinguishable because
in it victim B herself fails to secure treatment, while in a nonsupport
suit the infant "victim" is innocent of such failure. The infant after
1973 loses nothing in his innocence. As the party protecting the
infant's right, the state retains the enforceable claim for the entire
amount necessary for the child's support. The prosecution after 1973
simply has one parental defendant solely liable for the entire sup-
port obligation, rather than two parent potential defendants liable
for the same amount.
If the ultimate outcome (childbirth) is beyond the father's con-
trol and is instead permanently in the hands of an independent
party, a father's role, according to the criminal analogy, is no more
113. Comment, Causal Relation Between Defendant's Unlawful Act and the Death,
supra note 54, at 678-79.
114. Id. at 678.
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than that of one condition precedent to the ultimate liability for
child support. His part is that of a necessary but not sufficient
cause, like that of the maternal grandfather: "Had there been no
grandfather, there would have been no grandson. But birth is not
derived from the grandfather."" 5 Indeed, after 1973 birth is, in ef-
fect, derived exclusively from the mother.
As a mere condition precedent like the maternal grandfather,
the father is also similar to the vendor of a gun used in a homicide.
Such a vendor-even one selling in violation of a statute-is not
held liable for the homicide to which he contributed by supplying
the gun."' Arguing from the criminal law analogy, neither should
the father be held liable for the consequences of the pregnancy.
NONLIABILITY AS EQUITABLE POLICY
If removal of the civil and criminal liability of fathers to main-
tain their infants seems as if it is an unsound policy, the harshness
of that liability should be weighed against the liability's root. If
birth is the direct cause giving legal personality to an infant, preg-
nancy is the indirect cause. And what produces the pregnancy it-
self? As Mr. Justice Douglas suggested in concurring in Roe, un-
wanted pregnancies are produced by the "vicissitudes of life.""' 7
These vicissitudes produce the pregnancy resulting in personality-
granting childbirth.
The foundation of the liability for child support incumbent
upon parents after birth is therefore a haphazard accident of life,
e.g., the casual, happenstance impregnation of the mother by the
father. To saddle a man with twenty years of expensive, exhausting
child support liability"' on the basis of a casual vicissitude of life
seems to shock the conscience. This especially is so if the alternate
target for exclusive liability-the mother-embraces childbirth not
as a happenstance vicissitude, but as a calculated outcome freely
chosen over her guaranteed option to have an abortion.
115. Ryu, Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 773, 789 (1958).
116. Comment, Causal Relation Between Defendant's Unlpwful Act and the Death,
supra note 54, at 669.
117. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 215 (1973)(Douglas, J., concurring).
118. In 1973 one attorney estimated that it cost $125,000 to raise a child and send it to
college. Goodman, Doe and Roe: Where Do We Go From Here?, 1 WoMEN's RIGHTS L. REP.
20, 36 (1973).
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This conclusion does not rely too heavily upon one isolated
phrase of a single justice writing in the modern and liberal time-
frame of 1973. Unwanted pregnancies long have been appraised with
words similar to those of Justice Douglas. In 1906 the Supreme
Court of Nebraska, for instance, held that a father was liable to
support children born of a marriage voided due to the husband's
age."' The court's language is instructive: "There would be neither
reason nor justice in a rule that would visit the consequence of a
mutual indiscretion exclusively upon the wife."' To say that chil-
dren that parents do not want to support were born of a mutual
indiscretion is to find them produced by the all too human mistakes
of daily living.
Twenty years of child support liability for the chance happen-
ing of a pregnancy seems to be a severe judgment for modem courts
to impose upon the 1975 father. As the Nebraska Supreme Court
discerned, the children to whom the 1906 father was liable were born
of an indiscretion that was mutual. But the child of 1975 is not born
as a result of a mutual decision. Rather, today's child is born if and
only if his mother coolly elects his birth during a protracted period
in which she has the power of unilateral decision. As the child of
1906 deserved support by the father whose role in a mutual indiscre-
tion produced the child, so perhaps the child of 1975 should be
supported solely by the mother whose solitary decision produced
him. o
It cannot be argued today that the already pregnant woman
does not actually "decide" to bear the child when childbirth in fact
results from pregnancy. Similarly, it cannot be said that once im-
pregnated the modern woman is helplessly swept toward child-
birth. 2' "To bear" is as genuinely a decision as is "to abort."'2 This
119. Willits v. Willits, 76 Neb. 228, 231, 107 N.W. 379, 380-81 (1906).
120. Id. at 231, 107 N.W. at 380 (emphasis added).
121. The sweep has been seen as, if anything, in the opposite direction:
Now that abortion is a commonplace, a readily available option, the decision rests
with the woman alone. In fact, it has become necessary to remind ourselves that
abortion is a decision and not an inevitability, and to generate some normative
guidelines for how abortion is to be used.
Adler, supra note 47, at 164 (emphasis in original).
122. The childbirth option is commonly seen as hinging on maternal decision: "Choos-
ing to bear a child is a hard and immense decision. Even the legitimate and long-desired child
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has been enunciated repeatedly in judicial opinions. For example,
Mr. Justice Douglas discussed the woman's "basic decision whether
to bear an unwanted child."' 23 The Supreme Court has alluded to
"a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.' 24
These same words have been quoted by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts. 25 As one federal district judge correctly added:
"From conception until the end of the first trimester of pregnancy,
the decision whether or not to procure an abortion, and the effectua-
tion of that decision, rests with the pregnant woman and her physi-
cian."12 1
THE PRE-LEGISLATION COMPARISON
The arguable freedom of post-1973 fathers from any mainte-
nance duty of child support is not defeated by the fact that in the
period before 1821 when no American states had abortion laws regu-
lating the first trimester of pregnancy' z fathers still may have been
liable for the maintenance of their children. The change in the law's
conclusion necessarily follows from the factual premises which the
Supreme Court found had changed by 1973.
The Court discovered three reasons that had been advanced to
explain the enactment of nineteenth century abortion laws: Vic-
torian sexual mores, maternal health and protection of prenatal
life. 28 The Victorian mores explanation was dismissed out of hand
by the Court.'12 Giving protection of prenatal life far less attention
as a legislative rationale than maternal health,' 34 the Court dis-
missed the protection of-prenatal life as a legal consideration during
the first two trimesters of pregnancy. Maternal health appears to be
the rationale that the Court found underlying most abortion stat-
utes.
is not carried and borne easily by its mother." Barcus, Thinking Straight About Abortion,
CHRIsTINrrY TODAY, Jan. 17, 1975, at 8, 9.
123. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 214 (1973)(Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
125. Doe v. Doe, __ Mass. . -, 314 N.E.2d 128, 133 (1974).
126. Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 192 (D. Utah 1973)(emphasis added).
127. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 138-40 (1973).
128. Id. at 147-50.
129. Id. at 148.
130. Id. at 148-52.
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In Doe the Court explained:
that a century ago medical knowledge was not so advanced
as it is today, that the techniques of antisepsis were not
known, and that any abortion procedure was dangerous for
the woman. To restrict the legality of the abortion to the
situation where it was deemed necessary, in medical judg-
ment, for the preservation of the woman's life was only a
natural conclusion in the exercise of the legislative judg-
ment of that time.' 31
The same considerations were raised in Roe:
When most criminal abortion laws were first enacted, the
procedure was a hazardous one for the woman. . . . Abor-
tion mortality was high. Even after 1900, and perhaps until
as late as the development of antibiotics in the 1940's, stan-
dard modern techniques such as dilation and curettage
were not nearly so safe as they are today.' 31
It is little wonder that the Court added: "The few state courts called
upon to interpret their laws in the late 19th and early 20th centuries
did focus on the State's interest in protecting the woman's health
rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus.' ' 33
The eighteenth and nineteenth century father, having triggered
the pregnancy, could therefore not ever reasonably expect the inter-
vention of the mother to cut short the chain of causation ending in
childbirth. Any such intervention would have been a hazardous
procedure for the woman inasmuch as abortion mortality was high
and any abortion procedure was dangerous. The mother was locked
into the pregnancy for health reasons as genuinely as if abortion had
been prohibited by statute.
By 1973 the Court found an exactly converse situation. It dis-
closed "that abortion in early pregnancy, that is, prior to the end
of first trimester, although not without its risk, is now relatively
safe. Mortality rates for women undergoing early abortions, where
the procedure is legal, appear to be as low or lower than the rates
131. 410 U.S. at 190.
132. 410 U.S. at 148-49.
133. Id. at 151.
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for normal childbirth.' ' 34 The Court reiterated: ". . . until the end
of the first trimester mortality in abortion is less than mortality in
normal childbirth.' 135
Today abortion is therefore a "medical procedure"' 31 which,
when compared to the alternative of childbirth, may be a positively
healthy experience. A mother is no longer locked into pregnancy,
but is free under the criminal law to act as she chooses, reasonably
or unreasonably. However, as with other options, the abortion op-
tion carries with it responsibility for one's choice. If a woman exer-
cises her freedom to make a legal choice regarding abortion, she
cannot easily demand a helpless bystander to share her resultant
liability for child support. If she alone is to wield the right to choose
between childbirth and abortion, perhaps she alone must account
for the liabilities accompanying her choice.
THE POLICY POTENTIAL OF A PATERNAL VETO
Legalized abortion independent of a paternal veto hints at awk-
ward theoretical difficulties in the area of paternal support liability.
It is also difficult to find any equity in the law's policy of consigning
men to decades of constant financial accountability consequent to
an outcome - childbirth - over which the law denies these same
men a voice. For these reasons it is certain that many fathers will
attempt to avoid supporting their children in the future. The femin-
ist movement, a lobby generally endorsing abortion on demand, 137
134. Id. at 149.
135. Id. at 163. In Doe, the Court described abortion as a "surgical procedure." 410 U.S.
at 199. In Roe, Mr. Justice Douglas endorsed it for women as, if done early, "safer healthwise
than childbirth itself." 410 U.S. at 216 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Court took judicial
notice of various scientific and medical data in making such pronouncements. However, Chief
Justice Burger explained that the Court did not exceed "the scope of judicial notice accepted
in other contexts." 410 U.S. at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
136. 410 U.S. at 220 (Douglas, J., concurring).
137. See D. CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE & MoRALrrY 462 (1970). But, feminist
law professor Grace Olivarez has warned:
Perhaps in our eagerness for equality, we have, in fact contributed to the existing
irresponsible attitude some men have toward their relationship to women and their
offspring. Legalized abortion will free those men from worrying about whether they
should bear some responsibility for the consequences of sexual experience.
THE COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN FUTruRE, POPULATION AND THE
AMERICAN FUTURE 292 (1972)(separate statement).
Also of note is feminist Patricia Goltz's testimony before the Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Amendments of the Senate Judiciary Committee on August 21, 1974:
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draws attention to the failure of many fathers already to bear the
child support burden. 3 The nonliability argument drawing upon
the combined logic of Roe, Doe and Jones will certainly be invoked
by fathers in attempts to further avoid supporting their children.
Nor can it be concluded that the argument of paternal nonlia-
bility is too foreign to our culture and our law to be taken seriously.
Only two decades ago observers might have thought similarly as to
abortion itself. 19 Today one attorney's 1958 summary of American
religious thinking on abortion sounds antique: "All religious faiths
condemn illegal abortion, which is abortion performed when not
necessary to save the life or health of the mother."" 0 A similar
dramatic change in thinking and in the law may also occur with
regard to paternal liability for child support.
If legalized abortion is to remain part of American law, an
obvious and perhaps practically necessary corollary might be ulti-
mate recognition by both legislatures and courts of a paternal veto
power over the abortion decision.'' As indicated previously, the
Supreme Court expressly reserved comment in Roe on the father's
rights. Were parents to share equally the abortion-childbirth deci-
[Those favoring abortion] deny that there is any implied agreement on the part of
the woman to supply life-support systems to a child who otherwise would not live,
but many of them get violently angry if it is suggested that the father has not given
an implied agreement by his intercourse, to support the mother financially, even
though anybody or any group could substitute. In other words, the father, whose role
is not unique and irreplaceable, is to be held responsible for his actions, but the
mother, whose role is irreplaceable, is not to be held responsible for hers.
Hartle, Pro-abortionists testify before Bayh committee, NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Nov.
1974, at 12, col. 3 (emphasis in original).
138. See Tillmon, Welfare Is a Women's Issue, Ms., Spring, 1972, at 111. See also
Cowley, Paying Their Dues, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 1975, at 55.
139. In 1963, even those favoring abortion had such views:
In October, 1963, Glanville Williams, the spiritual father of abortion-on-demand, put
the proposition to the Abortion Law Reform Association that abortion be made a
matter between woman and physician up to the end of the third month. His proposal
was voted down by the then most organized advocates of abortion.
Noonan, The Right to Life: Raw Judicial Power, NAT'L Rav., Mar. 2, 1973, at 260, 261.
140. BLANSHARD, AMERIcAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER 143 (2d rev. 1958).
141. A veto power was claimed unsuccessfully by the husband-father in Doe v. Doe,
__ Mass. - 314 N.E.2d 128 (1974). He relied on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Goldberg in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965).
Last year the Supreme Court denied review of Jones and Coe. Jones v. Smith, 278 So.
2d 339 (Fla. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974); Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695
(S.D. Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2246 (1974).
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sion just as they share equally in procreation, equal support liability
would be both plausible and palatable. The case for the paternal
veto over the abortion decision is therefore a strong one.
It has been suggested that a paternal say in the abortion deci-
sion would lead to "ludicrous" circumstances,"' as where a father
might sue to compel abortion. This particular pitfall need not be
feared insofar as sexual equality would underlie any paternal veto
right.' Since pregnancy is a chain of causation jointly launched, a
joint decision should be required to sever it legally. As a result,
mothers would remain free of a father's suit to compel abortion just
as fathers would be free of a unilateral maternal power of life-and-
death over a father's offspring.
Further support for finding a paternal veto over the abortion
decision can be found in recent Supreme Court cases broadening the
rights of even unwed fathers over their children. Expanded rights
have been recognized in care and custody,14' adoption'"4 and custody
cases.'4" This expansion of paternal rights in the postnatal child
would mutually reenforce recognition of paternal rights in the pre-
natal child.
CONCLUSION
One rationale behind holding fathers civilly and criminally lia-
ble for the maintenance of their infant children is that fathers as-
sume voluntarily a role as a partner in creation of children. Contrac-
142. Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339, 344 (Fla. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958
(1974). But see D. CALLAHAN, supra note 137, at 466.
143. One opponent of the paternal veto concedes:
At the least, there is an injustice in giving males no rights prior to birth but then
imposing upon them a full range of obligations after birth. If the obligations toward
a child are mutual after birth, why should there not be a corresponding parity of
rights prior to birth? I have not seen a satisfactory answer to that question. More-
over, if - to accept the feminist premise - women have been forced to carry
through unwanted pregnancies because of male domination, the sexist shoe is put on
the other foot if all rights involved in having a child are ceded exclusively to women.
One injustice is corrected at the expense of creating another, and sexism is still
triumphant.
Callahan, Abortion: Some Ethical Issues, in ABORTION, SOCIETY AND THE LAw 89, 98 (Walbert
& Butler eds. 1973).
144. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
145. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Serv. of Wis., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
146. Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
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tual, tort and criminal law analogies to this rationale existed before
the Roe, Doe and Jones decisions. However, the holdings in these
cases undermine the rationale for paternal support liability in the
contractual, tort and criminal law analogies. As a result, the elimi-
nation of paternal liability for child support may be not only logi-
cally necessary, but also an equitable policy. Removal of this liabil-
ity because of legalized abortion would not contradict the logic be-
hind any liability that may have attached to fathers when abortion
was originally legal prior to any abortion legislation. But, as an
alternative to this drastic change in child support obligation, recog-
nition of a paternal veto over the abortion decision may be one
answer for legislatures and courts.
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